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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
was directed at proper punishment of a prior offender, where there
was no knowledge of the prior offense at the time of the trial. 12
The practice presently allowed prejudices the jury against the
defendant, without serving any useful function. The knowledge
of a prior conviction is necessary only after the conviction and then
merely to enable the trial judge to impose the proper punishment.
If the court does not see fit to eliminate this prejudicial practice
the legislature should act.
At The Trial
a. Evidentiary Ruling: The evidence allowed or denied ad-
mission at a tinal is in many cases the determining factor in de-
fendant's acquittal or conviction. His right to a fair trial is pro-
tected against prejudicial error by the appellate court's careful
scrutiny of the evidentiary rulings objected to. Such a decision,
however, is usually of little precedent value.
In People v. Feld,13 the trial court admitted into evidence
imperfect recordings of a telephone conversation1 4 incriminating
defendant. The recording was marred by many interruptions
and contained defendant's name only once. The defendant con-
tended that the recordings were mutilated or fabrications, and
tried to introduce testimony by a wire tap expert to this effect.
This testimony was denied admission, after evidence was admitted
to the effect that the expert could not tell if the records were
duplicates. or originals.
The Court of Appeals in a 4-3 decision, ruled that failure to
allow defendant a chance to disprove the authenticity of the record-
ings was not prejudicial error. Since the expert had already stated
he could not tell if the recording were originals or duplicates his
further testimony would have been valueless.
The dissent vigorously claims that the destruction of the au-
thenticity of the recordings would have gone a long way in de-
stroying the People's case and failure to admit testimony on this
vital question should compel reversal and a new trial.
b. Testimom.y of Previous Identification: At common law it
was a well settled rule that an identification by a witness, of a
defendant at a trial, could not be further supported by testimony
12. See N. Y. Lacrs. Doc. No. 84 at 22 (1926).
13. 305 N. Y. 322 113 N. E. 2d 440 (1953).
14. CoDE Cam!. Paoc. § 813(a). The wire taps were made pursuant to an order
of the court.
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that the witness had previously made a similar identification.15
The rationale for this rule lies in the belief that repetitive testi-
mony to the effect that defendant had been previously identified
has no probative value in proving defendant's identity, but is likely
to influence a jury on that issue.
The legislature has provided in § 393-b of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure for "Testimony of Previous Identification. When
identification of any person is in issue, a witness who has on a
previous occasion identified such person may testify to such pre-
vious identification." A recent case1" decided by the Court of Ap-
peals interpreted this section to be an exception to the common law
prohibition, insofar as the person who made the previous identi-
fication may testify thereto at the trial as a means of substantive
proof of identification.
On appeal the defendant in People v. TrowbridgeU7 raised the
question of whether other persons s may testify to a previous
identification by the identifying witness. All the judges concluded
that such testimony by other persons was inadmissible, since the
legislative exception to the general prohibition at common law, is
expressly limited to the person who made the previous identifica-
tion. The majority believed that due to the nature of the case,
the allowance of the inadmissable testimony was reversible error.
The dissent disagreed on this point.
The legislative provision 9 follows a theory contra to the com-
mon law belief, to the effect that testimony to a previous identi-
fication, usually made close, in point of time, to the crime carries
considerable evidentiary force.?° In a few instances2 this theory
has been mentioned for the basis of going one step further, and
allowing others to testify to the previous identification on the basis
that such testimony is primary evidence to show that a previous
identification had been made. The decision in the instant case
reaffirms the New York stand as to the merit of the common law
rule. This indicates that the court will limit testimony of previous
identification to that of the identifying witness and no others.
15. People v. Jung Hing, 212 N. Y. 393. 106 N. E. 105 (1914) ; This rule was
subject to exceptions where testimony was permissible as proof of credibility of the
witness, not substantive or affirmative proof of identity, after the witness had been dis-
credited or impeached.
16. People v. Spinello. 303 N. Y. 193, 101 N. E. 2d 457 (1951).
17. 305 N. Y. 471, 113 N. E. 2d 841 (1953).
18. E. g., a detective or clerk present at the tlme of identification.
19. CODE CMI. PROC. § 393 (b) (quoted in text).
20. 4 WGmoRE, EvIDmEcE § 1130 (3d ed. 1940).
21. Ibid; see DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F. 2d 364 (2d Cir. 1925) (concurring
opinion).
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c. Coerced Confessions: In People v. Leyra,2 the defendant
had been previously tried and found guilty of murder.2 The Court
of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial on the ground that
defendant's confession to a doctor summoned by the District At-
torney's office, was obtained by mental coercion and therefore in-
admissible. 2  The court did not rule on the validity of three sub-
sequent confessions, but instructed that these should be a jury
question, considered in the light of whether the mental coercion,
and a promise of leniency also contended to have been made by
the doctor, had influenced the defendant.2 5
At the second trial the Judge stated as a part of his charge
"that as a matter of law a promise of leniency had been made by
the doctor."' The defendant contended that under this charge
which becomes the "law of the case" the subsequent confessions
were inadmissible and no longer a jury question.
Three of the four members of the Court of Appeals who
voted to affirm the conviction, held that even after the finding of
a promise as a matter of law, it still remained a jury question
to decide if this promise and the mental coercion had induced the
defendant to make his subsequent confessions. The fourth mem-
ber of the court affirmed the conviction under § 542 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure2 without indicating any one "technical
error."
A strongly worded dissent concluded' that once the promise
was charged, as a matter of law, to have been used in inducing the
previously ddclared invalid confession, the subsequent confessions
to the police and assistant district attorneys, just two hours later,
must be deemed to have been induced by the same promise and
therefore inadmissible. Instructing the jury they might find
otherwise was opposed to logic and incompatible with the "law of
the case".
Another issue raised was the propriety of admitting the or-
iginal coerced confession into evidence at the second trial. This
was held to be proper, upon finding that the confession was in-
troduced only for consideration in determining whether the sub-
22. 304 N. Y. 468, 108 N. E. 2d 673 (1953), cert. denied, 345 U. S. 918 (1953),
rehearing denied, 345 U. S. 946 (1953).
23. People v. Leyra, 302 N. Y. 353, 98 N. E. 2d 553 (1951).
24. U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1; N. Y. CODE CTM. PRoc. § 395.25. See Lyons v. State of Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1943) ; Malinski v. Peopleof State of New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1944) ; Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156 (1953).26. "After hearing the appeal, the court must give judgments, without regard totechnical errors or defects to exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties.!
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sequent confessions were coerced and that the jury had been effec-
tively instructed that the first confession was not to be considered
on the issue of guilt-"
The decisions on the two issues involved in this case are in
line with present due process standards. 28 However, there is a
pregnant danger in stating that coercive -confessions are invalid,
but subsequent confessions are not, depending on a jury deter-
mination of continuing influence. This may encourage law en-
forcement officials to obtain confessions by means of coercion and
inducement, with the hope that subsequent confessions obtained
before the influence has sufficiently worn off, may be permitted
into evidence.
d. Misconduct of Jurors: The defendant in People v. Coc-
co29 was convicted of grand larceny. At the trial, the defendant
had put his character in issue by being sworn in as a witness on
his own behalf. After the case had been submitted to the jury for
deliberation, one of the alternate jurors who had been discharged
at the end of the trial met and informed one of the women jurors,
as she was proceeding to dinner with the other members of the
jury, that Cocco ran a "sporting house". After the verdict the
informed juror made an affidavit stating she had not at anytime
mentioned this conversation to the other jurors.
Defendant's motion for a new trial 08 was denied by the trial
court and the Appellate Division.31 On appeal, the majority and
dissent agreed that the informed juror had done no wrong but that
the discharged alternate juror had.
The majority reversed and granted a new trial, finding that
they could not say that the information given the juror, at the
time the jury Was deliberating the issues of fact, including the
defendant's character, did not prejudice the defendant's substan-
tial rights.
The dissent reasoned that the misconduct had not been shown
to have any influence on any jurors, so-no substantial right of the
defendant had been prejudiced.
This case -is another illustration of the court striving to pro-
tect the defendant's right to a fair trial where it is difficult to as-
certain the seriousness of the error committed.
27. See Malnski v. People of State of New York, supra note 25.
28. See note 25 supra; 19 BRooKxLY L. REv. 316 (1953); 3 Bso. L. Rxv. 146
(1953).
29. 305 N. Y. 282, 113 N. E. 2d 422 (1953).
30. CoDE CRmd PRoc. § 465 (3) (misconduct of jurors).
31. People p. Cocco, 280 App. Div. 960, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 668 (4th Dep't 1952).
103
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e. Charge: In People v. Lupo,82 the defendant was found
guilty on all counts for which he was indicted. On appeal the de-
fendant contended that the judge's charge was inadequate, in that
it failed to clearly point out to the understanding of the jurors all
the necessary elements of each crime and the possible verdicts.
The conviction was unanimously reversed and a new trial ordered,
upon finding that repeated questioning by the jurors directed at
clarification of the charge failed, thereby leaving the jurors with-
out a clear understanding of the questions presented. The judge's
charge, a means of guiding laymen in carrying out their import-
ant responsibility, must be something more than 'a collection of
accurate statements of the law; it must present clearly to the jury
the issues involved or it will be deemed inadequate.
f. Conviction under Wrong Statute: In People v. Costello,a3
there was a conviction for damaging a tire on an automobile, un-
der one of the so called "catch-all" sections of the Penal Law 4
'which provides punishment for injury to personal property where
it is not otherwise specifically prescribed. On appeal the convic-
tion was reversed and the information dismissed upon a finding
that a Penal Law Section 5 expressly provides for punishment
of defendant's act. The court coficluded that the provision under
which defendant was convicted was not applicable since by its
terms it was intended to cover situations not provided for by any
other penal section..
g. Imposition bf .entence: In Hogan v.. Bohan," the Dis-
trict Attorney obtained an order under C.P.A. § 1283 T directing
T"udge Bohan to pronounce sentence upon a defendant. The neces-
sity for the order arose when -the defendant was found guilty ofa felony, committed while on parole, thereby subjecting himself to'§ 219 of the Correction Law,38 which requires defendant to serve
the balance of his previous unexpired prison term before begin-
ning his new sentence. To avoid this seemingly harsh treatment,
the judge deferred defendant's sentence on the assumption defend-
ant might thus avoid being subjected to this section.39 This case
32. 305 N. Y. 448, 113 N. E. 2d 793 (1953).
33. 304 N. Y. 63, 110 N. E. 2d 880 (1953).
34. PENAL LAw § 1433 (2).
35. PAx LAw § 1425 (lia).
36. 305 N. Y. 110, 111 N. E. 2d 233 (1953).37. Provides for relief by means of obtaining an order compelling performanceof a duty just as a writ of mandamus did at common law.
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states the self-evident proposition that following an adjudication
of guilt, judgment must be imposed and may not be deferred or.
postponed indefinitely.'
Right of Appeal
It is a well established rule that appeal is not a matter of
constitutional right, and in non-capital criminal cases an appeal
lies only by statutory authorization.
41 In the case of In re Ryan,
4 2
petitioner's motion to dismiss four subpoenas duces tecum re-
turnable before the Grand Jury was denied by the Court of Gener-
al Sessions, which had only criminal jurisdiction.43  The Code of
Criminal Procedure44 makes no provision for the review of an
order denying a motion to vacate a subpoena. 5
The petitioner appealed under C.P.A. § 631 (2)." The Ap-
pellate Division held47 that the order was appealable under this
C.P.A. section but upon reviewing the merits, refused to vacate
all the subpoenas.
The Court of Appeals in reviewing, after cross appeals, de-
nied the petitioner any standing to appeal under the C. P. A. and
thereby refused to review the merits of the case. The Court stated
that the C. P. A. applies only to civil actions and civil proceed-
ings except where otherwise specified. The petitioner chose to
proceed in a court which had only criminal jurisdiction, in a
matter somewhat related to criminal law, and thereby is deemed
to have instituted a criminal proceeding, where the right to
appeal is regulated by criminal procedure.
It is implied that the petitioner could have instituted his
motion to dismiss the subpoena in a court of both civil and criminal
jurisdiction, and by so doing may have been able to appeal under
the applicable C. P. A. sections. The rule, though unclear, would
seem to be that the right of appeal on a proceeding either civil or
criminal in nature is dependent on the jurisdiction of the court in
which the proceeding is originally brought. 8
40. The judge must pronounce judgment, either -to sentence defendant to a term
in prison or to suspend sentence, or to impose a sentence and suspend its execution.
41. People v. Reed, 276 N. Y. 5, 11 N. E. 2d 330 (1937) ; People v. Zerillo, 200
N. Y. 443. 93 N. E. 1108 (1911).
42. 306 N. Y. 11. 114 N. E. 2d 183 (1953).
43. CODE CRU. FRoc. § 51; People ex rel Jerome v. Court of General Sessions,
185 N. Y. 504, 78 N. E. 149 (1906).
44. CoDE Cm. PRoc. § 517-52-0.
45. Matter of Turecamo Contracting Co., 260 App. Div. 253. 21 N. Y. S. 2d 270
(2d Dep't 1940).
46. An appeal may be taken in special, proceedings: "From an order, affecting
a substantial right, made by a court of record possessing original jurisdiciton, or a
judge thereof in a special proceeding instituted in that court . . ."
47. In re Ryan, 281 App. Div. 953. 120 N. Y. S. 2d 110 (1st Dep't 1953).
48. See Matter of Clan-si, 296 N. Y. 354, 73 N. E. 2d 548 (1947).
